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INTRODUCTION
Government, authority, control, power. Governance is all these
and more.
Governance may be defined as the manner in which power is.
exercised in the management of a country's economic and social
resources for development. However, governance is not simply
about how government conducts business in its own sphere; it is
also about how government interacts with civil society. It tells how
well government has encouraged and facilitated people's
participation not only in the delivery of services but also in the
evaluation and monitoring of government performance itself.
Governance is a complex concept. It includes the state's
institutions and structures, decisionmaking processes, capacityto
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implement and the relationship between government officials and
the public (Landell-Mills and Serageldin 1992).
As such, governance has both political and technical dimensions.
•It relates to a nation's political system and how this system functions
in relation topublic administration. At the same time, it also involves
the efficiency and effectiveness of public management. The key to
improving the level of governance is to find rules and norms that
create incentives for state agencies, officials and civil society to act
in the collective interest at the least cost to society (World Bank 1997).
Objectives of the Study
The primary objectives of this study are:
• to develop measurable indicators of good governance at the
local government level;
• to test how applicable these indicators are in evaluating and
monitoring LGU performance; and
• to find out how these indicators can be integrated in a
monitoring and evaluation system within the framework of
Sustainable Human Development.
In particular, this study attempts to develop a composite index
of the quality of governance at the local government level. In doing
so, the biggest challenge lies in being able to reduce the multiple
facets of the governance concept into a small number of key
observable dimensions. Furthermore, there is the task of defining a
limited number of indicators which are able to capture the essence
of each dimension and which can be measured with some
consistency and comparability over time and space,
The governance quality index that was constructed for this study
focuses on three principal elements: (1) capacity of the LGU to
mobilize and utilize resources; (2) efficiency and effectiveness in
the delivery of social services; and (3) presence of mechanisms to
ensure accountabili[y.
Nonetheless, this study's view of governance is not limited to
these aspects alone. Indeed, it is recognized that on a broader scale,
governance indicators should also encompass the legal frameworkMANASAN, GONZALEZ & GAFFUD •INDICATORS OFGOODGOVERNANCE[ 151
for development including the judicial system, economic
management, and egalitarian income distribution (World Bank 1992;
Huther and Shah 1998). However, this study deems that these
dimensions of governance are more applicable to the central
government than to LGUs.
: Limitations
While the better measures of governance are based on outcome
indicators (like the UNDP's human development index, HDI),
outcome indicators are usually not measured often enough (either
because it is costly to do so or because many outcome indicators do
not show significant changes when measured frequently) for them
to be more useful in the perspective of development administration.
In this regard, the use of input, output or process indicators may be
justified on the grounds that these intermediate indicators serve as
forerunners of the corresponding outcome indicators. This, of
course, presupposes a strong link between the intermediate
indicators and the outcome indicators. For instance, studies have
shown a strong connection between government social/human
development expenditures andHDI (UNDP 1996). Countries that
spend more on social/human development tend to rank high in
HDI.
The governance indicators developed in this study are, at best,
limited to "end points" or output indicators. The indices constructed
are not intended to supply information on why the results are the
way they are. The indices developed may provide Some clues, but
they will not explain why some LGUs perform better than others.
To determine the reasons for the outcomes would require a full-
blown evaluation type assessment that is outside the scope of this
studyJ
ICt)ok et al. (1993) point out that only an in-depth evaluation can measure impacts and can
tell what produced them. Evaluations seek to identify causal relationships. In contrast,
perfornlance measurement focuses on effectiveness and efficiency and provides a feedback
to managers and policymakers.152 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
This section surveys two classes of works that are relevant in
the task of constructing indicators of good governance. The first
group focuses on the conceptual underpinnings of governance. The
second one deals with the more empirical concern for performance
measurement.
Elements of Good Governance
It has been observed that it is the quality of governance and not
the type of political regime, per se, that has made the difference in
the economic performance of Asian countries. Project evaluations
conducted by the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank
show that project performance is largely determined by the
countries' overall capacity for administration or implementation of
programs.
These findings indicate the importance of the nonpolitical and
functional elements in the strategic interactions between government
and citizens. Specifically, they highlight the fundamentals of
accountability, transparency and predictability (Root 1995). In like
manner, the World Bank (1992) emphasizes four dimensions of
governance: capacity and efficiency of the public sector,
accountability, legal framework for development, and transparency
and information.
On the other hand, Landell-Mills and Serageldin (1992) include
the following as the critical elements that make up good governance:
political and bureaucratic accountability, freedom of association,
objective and efficient judiciary, freedom of information and
expression, and efficient public institutions. Meanwhile, Huther and
Shah (1998) consider four observable aspects of governance: citizen
exit and voice, government orientation (judicial efficiency,
bureaucratic efficiency and lack of corruption), social development
(i.e., human development in the tradition of UNDP plus equity) and
economic management.
Accountability and Participation. Accountability holds public
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imperative forthemtobe responsive to the needs of the citizenry.
At the local level, accountability requires that institutions have the
flexibility to allow beneficiaries to improve program/project design
and implementation. It also entails the establishment of criteria to
gauge the performance of local officials and the creation of oversight
mechanisms to ensure that standards are met.
Accountability may be obtained at two levels: macrolevel
accountability and microlevel accountability (Paul 1991; World Bank
1992).
Macrolevel accountability refers to the system whereby ministers
are accountable to the legislature and/or political leadership and
whereby civil servants are accountable to the ministers. It has two
main aspects: financial accountability and economic accountability.
On the one hand, financial accountability involves: "a properly
functioning government accounting system for effective expenditure
control and cash management; an external audit system which
reinforces expenditure control by exposure and sanctions against
misspending and corruption; and mechanisms to review and act on
the results of audits and to ensure that follow-up action is taken to
remedy problems identified" (World Bank 1992).
On the other hand, economic accountability refers to the
evaluation and monitoring of efficient use of resources in
government. It may be reflected in performance contracts,
memorandums of understanding, value for money audits and
legislative review of ministry or department activities.
M:acro-level accountability may be promoted by: making
comprehensive and timely information available; classifying
expenditures in a manner consistent with budget programs; doing
appropriate analyses for decisionmaking; comparing budgets with
results; improving the organization and accounting system in the
finance ministry; increasing the legal requirements for financial
reporting; ensuring the independence of the audit organization; and
focusing on "value-for-money" audits.154 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
In contrast, micro-level accountability results from two basic
factors. The first refers to the willingness and ability of the public to
"exit", meaning to consider other options when dissatisfied with a
public service (Paul 1991). Exit is greatly influenced by the degree
to which the public has access to alternative suppliers of a given
public service. Policies and mechanisms that promote greater
competition like deregulation, contracting out of services to multiple
private providers and public-private or public-public competition
enhance exit. Citing Baumol and Lee (1991), the World Bank (1992)
noted that contestability is crucial in creating a competitive
environment. That is, when incumbents are made to bid for contracts
along with outside competitors or when regulations favor new
entrants, then incumbents are more conscious of turning in a good
performance.
The second aspect of micro-level accountability refers to the
willingness and ability of the public tOexert pressure on providers
to perform well (i.e., the use of "voice"). Voice depends on the degree
to which the public can influence the quality and quantity of a service
through some form of articulation of preferences (World Bank 1997).
A survey of beneficiaries' satisfaction with the amount of services
provided is one way of providing "voice mechanisms." So are
procedures for making complaints and institutions like the
ombudsman. Participation of nongovernment organizations or
private sector representatives in decisionmaking or regulatory bodies
is still another way of promoting voice.
The choice between exit and voice mechanisms should be guided
by the factors which foster each of these options. The potential for
exit depends on the presence of economies of scale (monopoly-
the telecommunications industry used to consist of only one big
industry player; so with the local airline industry), legal barriers to
entry, and spatial barriers to exit (e.g., remoteness of a village so
that it is efficiently served by only one school or clinic).
in contrast, the potential for voice is influenced by legal,
institutional and informational barriers facing the public, the public's
level of income and education, and nondifferentiability of the publicMANASAN, GONZALEZ & GAFFUDINDICATORS OFGOODGOVERNANCE 155
service. For example, the absence of freedom of association, of
participation and of expression certainly hampers the exercise of
voice. So does lack of information. Also, low education levels
constrain the public's ability to evaluate options and participate in
public debates.
Paul (1991) posits the following propositions in evaluating the
menu of exit/voice options. First, when the public service operates
as a local monopoly due to spatial barriers and when the public is
characterized by low incomes and legal, institutional and
informational barriers, imprinted accountability is better achieved through
the use of voice. Under these conditions, the use of voice is likely to
be stimulated by the intervention of agents outside of the local
community (e.g., NGOs).
Second, when the public service is characterized by large
economies of scale and/or legal barriers to entry, when service
differentiation is difficult and when the public is not constrained by
low incomes and limited information, voice will tend to be used to
induce greater accountability. The use of voice under these
conditions is likely to be initiated by the public and not throug h
external agents. Third, when public service can be differentiated,
when iris not constrained by economies of scale and the public faces
income, informational and institutional barriers, improved
accountability is achieved through the use of exit.
The World Bank (1992) also asserts that micro-level
accountability reinforces macro-level accountability. On the other
hand, Paul (1991) makes a stronger statement in noting that overall
public accountabilitay is sustainable only if macro-level accountabilifad is
reinforced by micro-level accountability but that competition and/or
participation cannot substitute for good financial a/zd economic
accountability.
Lander-Mills and Serageldin (1992) adds a third dimension to
public accountability: political accoun tabilitay. In their view, political
accountability is enhanced by the presence of a system of popular
choice, which makes governments responsive to popular demand.156 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
Transparency and information. Transparency implies the
provision of relevant and reliable information to all. The private
sector needs accurate and timely information about the economy
and government policies for effective decisiortmaking. Transparency
in decisionmaking and implementation reduces uncertainty and can
curb corruption among public officials. It complements and
reinforces accountability (by enhancing efficient use of resources
and by promoting participation) as well as predictability (by
lowering uncertainty and transactions costs) [World Bank 1997]).
Predictability, presence of legal framework. Predictability refers
to the fair and consistent application of laws, regulations and policies.
Itis important in creating a stable economic environment that allows
prospective investors to assess opportunities and risks, to transact
business with one another, and to have a reasonable assurance or
recourse against arbitrary interference (World Bank 1992).
Predictability has five critical elements: (1) there is a set of rules
known in advance; (2) the rules are actually in force; (3) there are
mechanisms assuring application of the rules; (4) conflicts are
resolved through binding decisions of an independent judicial body;
(5) there are procedures for amending the rules when they no longer
serve their purpose.
In less analytic and more popular literature, Osborne and Gaebler
(1992) enumerate the characteristics of good governments-
decenta'alized, catalytic, community-owned, competitive, mission-
driven, results-oriented, customer-driven, enterprising, anticipatory
and market-oriented. These are the same qualities that characterize
the best-run companies or corporations. In the midst of serious social
problems and swift global transformations, the authors espouse a
highly decentralized and nontraditional form of governance to
maximize productivity and effectiveness. Good governance based
on these principles would mean a shift from traditional to new roles
and structures.
Catalytic and community-owned government. Local chief
executives now assume the role of facilitating problem-solving by
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to the tasks of collecting taxes and delivering services. They are
also involved in defining community problems and mobilizing
scarce public and private resources to achieve community
aspirations.
A catalytic local government assumes more "steering" functions
(as opposed to "rowing") by leading society, convincing its various
interest groups to embrace common goals and strategies. As such,
the focus of a catalytic government (or one that acts as a change
agent) shifts from "doing" things (from delivering services) to
making more policy decisions and putting more social and economic
institutions into motion. It is also one that ensures that other
institutions are delivering services (instead of hiring more public
employees to do the job).
Catalytic local governments may contractout some services but
privatization is just Oneof the answers. It is not the only answer.
Community services and programs offered by local governments
may be designed such that the clients are empowered and become
less dependent on government for their needs. Local officials may
also facilitate ownership of programs by the community through
the self-help process. Nongovernmental organizations and people's
organizations may be tapped toassist in promoting self-help and in
formulating and implementing development projects.
Competitive, enterprising, anticipatory, results-orienteh
governance. Local governments, as further illustrated by Osborne
and Gaebler (1992), should take a competitive stance to achieve
greater efficiency. They should promote competition among service
providers to keep costs down and to induce greater customer
satisfaction. Local governments could enhance competition by
encouraging private firms to provide goods and services thatwere
previously provided by the public sector either by load shedding
(with the government consciously withdrawing from public
provision ), procurement or contracting.2
2Contracting is not easy. Osborne and Gaebler note thatcontracting works bestwhen public
aget'tciescan define precisely what they want done, generate competition for thejob, evaluate
a contractor'sperformanceand replaceOr penalize those who fail to achieve expected,
performance levels.158 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
Local authorities should also be enterprising in the sense that
they should look for innovative ways to create revenue (such as
charging user fees for some public services, like the use of public
rest rooms, parking lots) and investing for returns (i.e., evaluating
the returns on their spending as if it were an investment). It is also
important that governments put the right incentive structure in place.
One way of doing so is by allowing governments/agencies/
departments to keep some of the money they make or save through
such mechanisms like shared savings/earnings and revolving or
enterprise funds.
Good local governance requires foresight. Local governments
should focus more on prevention rather than cure, as it is easier and
less expensive to solve problems rather than to respond to crises.
Prevention is particularly beneficial in health care and environmental
protection. Thus, good governments are able to anticipate the future
and to make decisions based on their vision of the future (e.g.,
through strategic planning).
A results-oriented local government gives more attention to
funding, monitoring and measuring project/program outcomes
rather than inputs (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). In contrast, when
institutions are funded according to inputs, they have little incentive
to turn in a good performance. In this light, a set of performance
measures and, possibly, a system of linking funding or rewards with
results is needed to ensure that program outcomes are achieved)
At the personnel level, Root (1995) adds that clear career paths
and adequate compensation are essential in improving staff
productivity. This indicates the need to establish mechanisms to
evaluate performance so that promotion is based on achievement.
Also, compensation and other incentives, like opportunities for skills
upgrading, should be linked with successful program
implementation.
s0sbome and Gaebler (1992) pointed out floatmlmy times performance measurement achieves
good results quite independently of the reward/incentive system.MANASAN, GONZALEZ & GAFFUD : INDICATORS OFGOODGOVERNANCE 159,
Decentralized decisionmaking and fiscal responsibility. Shah
(1994) argues that decentralization of fiscal responsibility contributes
to the efficient provision of local public services since expenditures
are matched closely which local preferences and needs. Moreover,
,, accountability is promoted by the clearer and closer linkage between
the benefits and costs of local public services. Oates (1972) further
emphasizes the principle of subsidiarity: public services are provided
most efficiently by "the jurisdiction having control over the
minimum geographic area that would internalize benefits and costs
of such provision."
Also, the greater responsiveness of local governments to local
demands encourages fiscal responsibility and efficiency if financing
is also decentralized and interjurisdictional competition and
innovation are enhanced (Root 1995). In line with this, the principle
of subsidiarity has also been put forward with respect to taxation:
lower levels of government should be assigned to collect taxes unless
a convincing case can be made for it to be given to higher levels of
government.
Thus, decisionmaking should occur at the lowest level of
government on the grounds of efficiency, accountability,
manageability and autonomy. However, economies of scale and
benefit-cost spillovers (or externalities) may alter these results
somewhat. Economies of scale arise when the costs of production
(per unit of output) decline with the scale of production. In many
coun:tries, for instance, the cost per resident of delivering specific
types of services (like water supply and sewage treatment) decreases
as the number of residents increases. Similarly, certain services
require specialty services that can only be justified for large client
populations. Examples of these are tertiary hospitals and fire-
fighting equipment for high-rise buildings (Bahl and Linn 1992). In
these cases, the optimal size "plant" for providing certain kinds of
services in the most-cost effective manner may be larger than a local
jurisdiction.160 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
On the other hand, benefit or cost spillovers occur when the
benefits/cost of a public service are realized by nonresidents of the
jurisdiction providing the said service to its constituents. For
instance, local health services such as immunization lower the
morbidity risks not only of the residents of a given municipalities
but also those of other municipalities (Capuno and Solon 1996).
Similarly, polluting activities in upstream municipalities increase
the health risks and, consequently, the demand for health services
in downstream municipalities.
The optimal size of jurisdiction will vary with specific instances
of economies scale and benefit/cost spillouts. The optimal provision
of public services is ensured when the marginal benefit equals the
• marginal cost of production. This is achieved when the benefit area
and the political jurisdiction are congruent. When this occurs fiscal
equivalency is said to be in place (Oslon 1969). In such a situation,
the free-rider problem is surmounted. However, the fiscal
equivalency principle may require a different-sized jurisdiction for
each public service.
Measuring the Performance of Governments
Ou_ut-input efficiency measures. According to Hatry et.al.
(1992), efficiency measures of local governance are output-input
ratios with outputs defined in terms of (1) work load, (2) some
measure of effectiveness, and (3) equipment and personnel
utilization rates. 4
Harry, et, al, give examples of these measurements. One of their illustrations is on fire protection and is shown below;
Fire Protection- Measures of Efficiency
Type 1: Output in units of work load nver input
number of firecalls responded to per dollar
number of fire prevention Inspections per dollar, perhaps categorized By residential or commercial
Type 2: Output in units of effectiveness over input
number of fires fought for which less than a target amount of spread occurred per suppression
number of households _¢td business establishments "protected" per dollar, with "protected" defined as those
establlshment_ without a fire during the period
Type 3i Utll!zation Measure_
percentage of downtime of major fifo equipment
percentage of time fire crews are understaffedMANASAN, GONZALEZ & GAFFUD : INDICATORS OFGOODGOVERNANCE I 161
In the first measure, one or more physical workload units can
be identified as outputs. These outputs are then related to the amount
of resources used in producing them.
The second measure considers output in terms of the quality of
service provided. This type of measure, however, shares a
shortcoming that is common to all effectiveness measures. It is often
difficult to obtain some desirable indication of effectiveness in terms
of the success of prevention effort, i.e., prevention of crimes, fire,
traffic accidents, or diseases. In these cases, the approach often used
is to measure the number of incidents not prevented-the number
of crimes, fire, traffic accidents, or prevailing diseases. The authors
then argue that relating these to cost or time does not make sense.
Expressing effectiveness measures as percentages likewise is not of
much use; they should be converted to numbers which can be used
in the ratios.
The third measure reflects the amount of specific resources that
are utilized (or not utilized) for potentially productive activities. This
type of measure does not directly assess the amount of output
obtained from these resources and, thus, should be considered only
as a proxy indicator.
Harry et.al. (1992) caution that efficiency implies a certain level
and quality of service. An increase in the output-input ratio does
not indicate an improvement in efficiency if the quality of service is
not maintained, at the very least. Thus, it is necessary to examine
both efficiency and effectiveness measures to see the whole picture
of government performance. Moreover, the number of activities in
local governments that can be measured seems endless. This could
iead to excessive and tedious data collection and should be avoided.
In like manner, Gaffud (1997) enumerates three elements that
are essential in constructing indicators for measuring the
performance of the public sector: efficiency, effectiveness and
economy. Efficiency links outputs to costs; effectiveness ensures
the attainment of organizational objectives/goals; and, economy
matches actual to planned costs.162 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
Some of the measurements illustrated above, where quantitative
indicators are involved, may not actually workbecause of difficulties
in measuring public sector outputs not only in value terms but, at
times, also in physical terms. Gaffud (1997) contends that public
sector outputs are usually intermediate products that are, at best,
"proxies" for the intended final output. Examples of these are
outputs produced by regulatory and social service agencies.
While the output of some government agencies can be measured
(like postal services where service and cost comparisons with those
incurred by private firms can be made), measurement of public sector
output in other areas (like defense, regulatory activities and social
welfare programs) remains elusive. Thus, input indicators as proxies
for nonmarket outputs are generally acceptable.
Well-being indica tots. Several sets of indicators have been made
to assess the accomplishment of government in promoting human
or social development. The Social Indicators Project (SIP) done in
1973 by the Development Academy of the Philippines (DAP) was a
pioneering effort in this regard.
The SIP considered social concerns as the goals of Philippine
society and treated social indicators as synonymous to welfare
indicators. Present welfare consists not only of the welfare of
Filipinos currently alive but also of the welfare of future generations
(Mangahas 1976). The terms welfare, social, and development have
been said to carry some value or ethical content. In coming up with
welfare indicators, it has been argued that indicators cannot and
need not be free of value judgment. What is more important is that
elements of the judgment should be made explicit.
Research on social concerns and social indicators done in other
countries supplied the guidelines used by the SIP in drawing up
the list of basic Philippine social concerns. The following social
concerns were found to be universal and not at all unique to any
country: health and nutrition, learning, income and consumption,
employment, nonhuman productive resources, housing, utilities and
the environment, public safety and justice, political values, and social
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For each concern, a limited'number of measurable indicators
were drawn up. The indicators chosen were those which are reliable,
replicable, and simple to interpret in order to be easily understood
by the end-users-the general public. Also, there was a preference
in favor of final rather than intermediate indicators. In other words,
the indicators should reflect the outputs rather than the inputs of
the social system. For instance, it was noted that the crime rate is a
preferable indicator than the number of policemen per block. In
like manner, the proportion of people who are ill is a better indicator
than the number of hospitals beds available.
Measuring the citizen's level of awareness or satisfaction. For
all the technical difficulties they present, experiential (or public
opinion) surveys are perhaps the best way of seeing how things are
from the citizens' point of view. And as Jurado (1976) amply
demonstrates, these indicators may come in neat quantifiable
bundles. Consider three subjective indicators: index of political
awareness, index of political participation, and index of political
efficiency.




where PS is the average score on political awareness by
respondents i, and
n is number of respondents. In turn,
k
PSi = _ W_
, j l
where Wij is the score of respondent i on item j of political
awareness, participation or efficacy where there are a total of k items.
To measure political awareness/efficacy, respondents are asked
to indicate their awareness (or perceptions on the efficacy) of k
government programs or policies. To gauge political participation,
for instance, the respondents may be given five areas of community164[ JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
activities and asked.to identify what form of community
participation they would undertake ff given the chance to participate.
Similarly, perceptions on welfare or human conditions may be
quantified through ranking which is an average subjective rating
by the people themselves of the degree to which they felt, for
example, they are well-off, The weakness, however, of this approach
is that it does not indicate specific areas of failure and success. It is
also not always accurate since it relies heavily on people's
perceptions/expectations that change from time to time. To
illustrate, the average rating may drop despite rising levels of living
if high ex.pectations remain unfulfilled.
Construction of Composite Welfarefl-Iuman
Development Indices
The need to develop a single index for various aspects of
governance is genera!ly perceived to be important. Paqueo (1976)
contends that despite difficulties in coming up with an index to
monitor the health of the people, there is pressure to have one just
like the GNP which can be used to monitor the nation's economic
health. The construction of a composite measure of human
development which expresses various components in a single
magnitude is difficult but several successful efforts have been made.
Human development index. The human development index
(HDI), for one, has been widely accepted. The HDI is based on three
indicators: longevity, educational attainment and standard of living
(UNDP 1996). The UNDP's HDI methodology was used by the 1997
Philippine Human Development Report (PHDR) in computing
provincial level HDI for the Philippines (HDN/UNDP 1997). As
with the international computation, fixed minimum and maximum
values are applied: life expectancy at birth- 25 years and 85 years;
adult literacy-0% and 100%; combined primary, secondary and
tertiary enrolment ratios-0% and 100%; and real GDP per
capita-P3,350 and P19,056 for the period 1991-94 (both expressed
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For every province, an index each for life expectancy, literacy
and income is computed according to the general formula:
Actual X, - Minimum X_
Ii-
Maximum X, - Minimum X,
where the index I_refers to the index for each of the three
components. The HDI for a province is then obtained by taking the
average of the three components:
HDI = (1/3) (I_ + 12+ Is)
Capability poverty measure. The capability poverty measure
(CPM) is another index composed of three indicators: the percentage
of children under five who are underweight; the percentage of births
unattended by trained health personnel; and, the percentage of
women aged 15 years and above who are illiterate (UNDP 1996).
These indicators reflect the percentage of the population with
capability shortfalls in three corresponding dimensions of human
development: living a healthy, well-nourished life; having the
capability of safe and healthy reproduction; and being literate and
knowledgeable.
UNDP (1996) asserts that indicators to measure deprivation in
capabilities should directly reflect capability Shortfalls. If
unavailable, substitute indicators could be use, e.g., the availability
of trained health personnel to attend births, access to health services,
potable water and adequate sanitation. Nevertheless, indicators of
actual access is better than those of potential access. For instance,
rates of immunization or use of oral rehydration therapy are
preferable to data on travel time to a primary health care center in
monitoring the effectiveness of the public health system.
The CPM differs from the HDI in that it deals with people's lack
of capabilities, not with the average level of capability in the country.
The CPM is a more people-centered measure of poverty. It recognizes166[ JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
that human deprivation occurs in a number of critical dimensions.
Thus, it is multidimensional. Unlike income (which is the more
conventional way of measuring poverty), capabilities are ends rather
than means. They are not measured in terms of inputs but in terms
of human development outcomes- in the quality of people's lives.
In a sense, the expansion of capabilities defines human
development. However, the present formulation of the CPM is
faulted by its critics precisely because of the exclusion of income in
the index. They argue that the CPM should not ignore income in its
formulation in the same manner that the HDI includes per capita
GDP.
However, the 1996 Human Development Report argues that lack
of opportunity signifies that access to the means to develop or
maintain essential human capabilities is not being adequately
provided. Thus, indicators of the availability of social services which
are the direct means to ensure a decent standard of living would be
of better use than proxy indicators or indirect measures like income
as in the human development index.
The three variables used in the CPM are given equal weight in
the Composite index. This implies that each is a basic capability that
cannot substitute for another that is lacking. Since the three are
foundational capabilities, it is assumed that policy should not seek
to trade one off against another. If flexibility in weights is desired,
it has been suggested that respondents to surveys be asked to assign
weights to each capability by allocating a fixed total.
Minimum basic needs. Reyes and Alba (1994) cite the difficulty
in coming up with a single index of welfare status. They argue that
the Under 5 Mortality Rate (USMR) recommended by UNICEF may
be the best available indicator of overall social development because
of its broad coverage. However, they do recognize the need to
consider several measures to gauge the conditions of the household
or individual.
They note that it is important for policymakers to determine how
sensitive the indicators are to changes in macro policies, i.e., the
impact of macro policies on vulnerable groups. They contend that itMANASAN, GONZALEZ &GAFFUD : INDI-_TORSOFGOODGOVERNANCE 167
is essential to focus on indicators that are sensitive to policy changes,
even if they measure only one facet of human welfare. The minimum
basic needs (MBN) indicators are examples of such indicators.
The MBN indicators cover three important areas of concern:
survival, security and enabling needs. Survival indicators include
measures of health status (infant mortality rate, child mortality rate),
nutrition status (prevalence of moderate and severe underweight,
prevalence of acute and chronic malnutrition, prevalence of
micronutrient deficiencies, income above the food threshold), and
access to water and sanitation (proportion of households with
sanitary toilet facilities, proportion of households with access to safe
water supply). Security indicators include measures of income and
security (income above the total poverty threshold, amount of
household savings, employment or unemployment), shelter
(proportion of households in makes hift houses), and peace and order
(crime incidence, incidence of armed encounters). Lastly, enabling
need indicators include measures of basic education and literacy
outcomes (elementary enrolment, rate of completion, basic and
functional literacy), and participation (membership in at least one




As a general approach, this study first developed a conceptual
framework that helps define the key observable dimensions of
governance. Next, it broke down each of these dimensi6ns into their
principal elements. In turn, a limited number of measurable
indicators that are able to represent the more important character of
each of these elements were delineated.
This study adapted the objective tree approach used by Gaffud
(1997). Thus, the overall development goal of the LGU is defined in
terms of improved performance in social/human development.
Three strategic objectives are, then, deemed essential to the
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support for human/social development concerns; (2) enhanced
effectiveness/efficiency in social service delivery; and (3)
accountability systems developed and installed.
Inturn, each of these three strategic objectives is defined in terms
of component elements or result packages (RPs). The "optimized
resource support" objective is broken down into three RPs: revenue
generation; revenue use; and, adoption of systems to sustain revenue
generation and utilization. The "effectiveness/efficiency in social
service delivery" objective is supported by one RP: beneficiaries
satisfaction with social services delivered. The "accountability"
objective is specified to include the following result packages:
financial accountability systems developed and implemented; and
micro-level accountability systems developed and implemented.
The conceptual basis for the choice of dimensions, the principal
elements of each dimension and the performance indicators for each
of these elements are presented in detail in the next section. This
choice is largely driven by the governance concepts expounded in
the section Review of Literature. It attempts to address the following
questions: (1) Do these three dimensions of governance adequately
capture LGU performance in attaining the overall development goal?
(2) Do the different result packages satisfactorily support each of
the strategic objectives they represent? (3) How well do the
performance indicators/measures relate to each of the result
packages? (4) How do the alternative performance indicators rank
in terms of the different criteria set for choosing performance
indicators?
Data and Measurement
Data gathering. Most of the indicators listed in Figure I can be
measured based on LGU records, financial statements, other
pertinent documents and key informant interviews with local
government officials and NGO representatives. For instance, all the
indicators belonging to Strategic Objective I are of this type. In
measuring these indicators, existing LGU records in the pilot LGUs
were checked and validated by interviews with key local officials.MANASAN, GONZALEZ &GAFFUD •INDICATORS OFGOOD GOVERNANCE] 171
However, some of the indicators in Figure 1 are based on
experiential/attitudinal data that required the conduct of public
opinion surveys (e.g., those relating to micro-level accountability).
In this regard, the respondents to the opinion surveys were drawn
from local residents using multistage (cluster)sampling. In the first
stage, two barangays (one urban barangay and one ruralbarangay)
were drawn randomly from the different barangays in each pilot
LGU. Barangays were differentiated as to their urban character in
order to capture differences in the usage/satisfaction ofthe residents
for specified functions.
In the second stage, a sample of individual respondents was
drawn in each of the selected barangays. Since a complete listing of
the residents in these barangays was not easily available,
randomness was assured by interviewing household heads in every
other house lined up along the various thoroughfares in these
barangays.
The coverage of the public opinion survey conducted in this
study was sketchy because of time and resource constraints. On the
average, some 50 respondents were interviewed foreach pilot LGU.
Admittedly, this numberis not largeenough toyield a decent margin
of errorbut the surveys undertaken forpurposes of this study were
primarily done to pilot test the questionnaire and assess the
feasibility of applying this approach in a more rigorous manner in
future researches.
The questionnaire used for drawing out citizen's perception/
satisfaction with service delivery and overall governance was
patterned afterthe Social WeatherStation (SWS)surveys (Appendix
1).
Criteria in selecting indicators. In the beginning, the number
of measures included in the preliminary list of indicators was too
large in number (and thus, too complicated) to be of much use to
local chief executives, central government functionaries or local
voters (Appendix 2). However, the list was trimmed down in the
course of the study (during field testing and consultative workshops)172 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
based on the following criteria: _how specific, how quantifiable, how
universal, how credible, how simple and acceptable the indicators
are.
Specificity demands that the indicators provide information that
are disaggregated enough across functions or levels of government
to be meaningful to the various users of the indicator system
proposed. This implies that the indicators cannot be the "one-size-
fits-all" type. In contrast, universality implies that the indicators be
standardized to fit all levels of government or functions.
For purposes of this study, quantifiability means the indicators
can be measured in terms of either an ordinal/cardinal scale or
binary mode. 6The latter includes, for example, indicators that relate
to the presence/absence of certain modes of service provision or
revenue generation.
On the other hand, credibility refers to the absence of known
systematic built-in bias in the measurement of the indicators.
Simplicity implies that the indicators are clearly consistent with the
overall development goal as well as with the three strategic
objectives7 Lastly, acceptability implies that the indicators meet the
approval of the various stakeholders. The acceptability of the
indicators developed in this study was validated in workshops/
consultations conducted in various regions across the country.
It should be pointed out that these criteria are not entirely
compatible with one another. Some trade-offsbetween the different
criteria are evident. This is particularly true with regard to specificity
and universality.
Composite indices. A composite index was constructed for each
of the strategic objectives. The composite indices thus derived were
then consolidated into an overall governance index.
_hese criteria are drawn largely fron't the works of Jackson and Palmer (1988) and Gaffud
(1997).
6In this sense, even citizen's perception are quantifiable.
7Simplicity is largely assure d by the objective tree approach that is followed in this study.MANASAN, GONZALEZ &GAFFUD ' INDICATORS OFGOODGOVERNANCE 175
Initially, equal weights were assigned to the different indicators
(and different result packages). These weights were also validated
during the subnational and national workshops/consultations
conducted in the course of the study.
Pilot Testing. Given time and resource constraints, the
measurement of the indicators presented in Figures I and 2, as well
as the construction of the composite indices were pilot tested in three
pre-selected LGU clusters. Each cluster consisted of three
jurisdictions-one provincial government (PLGU), one city
government (CLGU) and one municipal government (MLGU). The
clusters were chosen on the basis of their provincial level HDI.
Provincial LGU City LGU Municipal LGU
High HDI Cavit¢ Trcc¢ Msrtirez Noveleta
MediL.n HDI Davao del None Davao Mabini
Low HDI Antique San Jose* Hamtic
"San'Jose was not yet city when the study was conducted but it is the most
urbanized municipali t in Antique.
CONSTRUCTION OF A GOVERNANCE INDEX
Choosing the Key Dimensions of Governance
As local governments make the painful passage to a
decentralized setup, they will be under close scrutiny to improve
their performance especially in human development. This is in
keeping with the mandate of the Local Government Code to establish
LGUs that are performance-based and charactrized by greater
managerial accountability for social or human development
outcomes.
Synthesizing the various elements of good governance that
emerge from the survey of literature, the present study started with
the premise that good governance at the LGU level is primarily
determined by how well LGUs perform in improving the quality of
life of their constituents; that is, how efficient and effective LGUs
are in bringing about social/human development.174 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
LGUs notonlyprovide goodsand services. Before theycaneven
start todo that, theymust first mobilize and allocate resources. They
alsoinvest resources and negotiate contracts. Alltheseactivities
impact strongly on final social outcomes.Thus, the way LGUs
manage resourcesisextremelyimportant. In thissense,local
authorities need to govern on the basis of consistencyand
transparency of processes and broad-based community support.
A responsive regulatory framework is a necessary condition for
good governance. It can expedite social development, if enforced
consistently. Equally necessary is an external environment in which
people are sufficiently aware and involved to demand better
performance. This includes a built-in mechanism for listening to
the community, forming partnerships with civil society and other
levels of government, and accepting feedback from oversight
agencies. If these conditions were met, LGUs would be in a good
position to improve social results for a given amount of social
spending. This should set off a virtuous circle in which each action
makes the next one less difficult. However, to chart the progress of
LGUs at each stage, there is a need for indicators that would assess
how responsive and accountable decisions are at the local level,
Given this perspective, it is imperative that LGUs pursue the
following three strategic objectives, if they are to attain the overall
goal of achieving a higher level of human development in their areas
of jurisdiction (Figure I and Figure 2):8
(1) Optimized resource support for human priority concerns.
This does not only mean raising and allocating money (even
ifbudgeted for human development concerns). It also means
diversifying revenue sources as well as providing the policy
and legal framework to ensure a steady source of income
that can be programmed for productive use.
SAdmittedly, governance has other dimensions in addition to the three outlined above: legal
framework for development including a sound judicial system, economic management, and
egalitarian income distribution. However, it is deemed that these facets are less important
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(2) Improved effectiveness and efficiency in social services
delivery. LGUs need to make serious attempts to (a)observe
standards and benchmarks for devolved social services; (b)
increase the level of satisfaction of beneficiaries with the
services delivered; (c) use nontraditional and innovative
modes of service delivery; and (d) encourage private
institutions to take an active part in social service delivery.
(3) Responsive and transparent decisions. This requires the
presence of a pro-active citizen feedback mechanism and
strong intergovernmental relations to promote innovations
in local resource management and social service provision.
It also means that accounting and auditing procedures that
promote restraint (to curb corruption and arbitrary action)
and flexibility (to encourage new and better ways of doing
things) are developed and implemented.
Choosing the Indicators
Strategic Objective I: Optimized Resource Support for Human
Priority Concerns
The capacity of LGUs to provide social services is largely
determined by their financial resources and their ability to manage
such resources vis-_i-vis competing demands. With devolution,
LGUs are faced with greater expenditure responsibilities,
particularly in the health and social welare sectors. Thus, one of the
major challenges they must deal with is how to mobilize additional
revenues from local sources even with the higher IRA share
mandated under the 1991 Local Government Code.
in this regard, LGUs must increasingly seek to diversify their
revenue sources, particularly through the institution of cost recovery
measures. That is, they have to look beyond traditional sources of
revenue like the real property tax and localbusiness taxes. Although
higher local taxes are usually met with some resistance, experience
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in other countries shows that citizens generally have a greater
willingness to pay fees in exchange for benefits received or services
rendered.
While increased financial support to the social service sectors is
an advantage, it is not sufficient in ensuring improvement in the
quality of life of local constituents, just as important are effective
and efficient service delivery mechanisms as well as strong
accountability mechanisms. In addition to the actual generation and
utilization of revenues, theachievement of Strategic Objective I also
requires that systems and processes that will enhance the
sustainability of these activities be put in place.
To sum up, the "optimized resource support" objective is broken
down into three result packages: revenue generation; resource
utilization; and adoption of systems and processes for increased
sustainabilit_/ of revenue generation and utilization efforts.
Revenue Generation
Two performance indicators are proposed for revenue
generation: local revenue effort and cost recovery in key economic
enterprises or relevant service sector of the LGU.
Local revenue effort may lYemeasured in numerous ways. Among
others, efficient collection of real property tax, ratio of real property
tax to total LGU income, ratio of local business taxes to total LGU
income, and ratio of the IRA to total LGU income (Gaffud 1997).
These measures, however, share a number of common
weaknesses. Mo_ of these indicators, if used singly, tend to favor
certain types of LGUs. For instance, the ratio of local business taxes
to total LGU income would tend to rate more urbanized LGUs
favorably since these LGUs are generally able to raise more revenues
from local business taxes (compared with rural LGUs) because of
the bigger share of transactions with industrial/commercial
character in these LGUs.
Moreover, these indicators, if taken individually, provide a
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the other hand, if they are used in conjunction with one another, the
indicator system will get too complicated.
Hence, this study recommends the use of per capita local source
revenue to measure local revenue effort. In principle, revenue effort
is measured by comparing actual revenues with the revenue base.
Due to the absence of more relevant data on the local revenue base,
it is proxied in this study by population.
Cost recovenj in key economic enterprises or semice sector is measured
as the ratio of actual revenues from a specified economic enterprise
to the actual expenditures on the said enterprise. For cities and
municipalities, the key economic enterprise considered is the public
market. Since provincial governments do not operate economic
enterprises, cost recovery is defined in terms of the operations of
•public hospitals given that these facilities are the most important
cost center in provincial government units.
Resource Utilization
The "resource utilization" result package is measured by two
performance indicators: per capita social service expenditures and the
ratio of LGU expenditures on social services to total LGU expenditures.
Actual LGU support to the attainment of human development
concerns is best measured by per capita LGU expenditures on the social
sectors. However, this indicator may have some bias in favor of
LGUs which have high per capita internal revenue allotment (IRA).
That:is, it is possible that some LGUs have low per capita social
service expenditures, not for lack of commitment to the human
development goal but due to lack of resources as a result of the
amount of IRA allotted to them. In view of this fact, this study
includes the LGU social service expenditure ratio as one of the
performance indicators for resource utilization, so that greater LGU
effort is given equal importance. In other words, the LGU social
expenditure ratio may be viewed as a measure of "effort" on the
part of LGUs given their capacities, while per capita social spending
may be understood as a measure of the "adequacy of effort" in
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Adoption of System for Revenue Generation and Utilization
The result package for "adoption of systems for revenue
generation and utilization" may be measured in terms of the
following performance indicators: regularity in the conduct of the
general revisionof the schedule of market values and the approval of the
Annual Development Plan by the LocalSanggunian.
Strategic Objective II. Effectiveness/Efficiency in Social
Service Delivery
In general, service delivery at the local level is still perceived
primarily as a function of government. Despite the devolution of
services that calls for the heightened participation of the private
sector and civil society, government continues to be the main
provider of services and facilities. Given this condition, good local
governance may be manifested through enhanced effectiveness and
efficiency in the delivery of social services.
While Strategic Objective Iaims to ensure that adequate financial
resources flow into social service sectors, Strategic Objective IIhelps
ensure that LGUs use these financial resources wisely. Foran LGU,
the task at hand is to maximize program impact for each peso spent.
In principle, effectiveness/efficiency in the delivery of social
services is best measured by outcome indicators like the human
development index (HDI) itself. However, social outcomes (like life
expectancy or literacy) are the result not only of LGU actions but
also of central government actions making attribution truly
problematic. This point assumes greater importance in cases like
the Philippines where social services are typically delivered along
two parallel tracks (an LGU track and a central government track)
or where central government agencies and LGUs provide
complementary inputs. It should be stressed that since the primary
concern in this study is the measurement of good governance at the
LGU level, it is essential that the indicators chosen are those that
pertain to LGU performance only.
Given these considerations, LGU effectiveness/efficiency in
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approaches: (1)use of efficiency measures; (2) use of measures of
client satisfaction, and (3) use of effectiveness measures.
Efficiency Measures
Efficiency indicators usually involve the computation of output-
input efficiency ratios where output is typically measured in terms
of workload units a la Harry et. al. (1992). However, there are two
difficulties in implementing this approach.
One, as already noted, public sector output is not easy to define.
Two, administrative data relating to LGU output in service delivery
are not uniformly available at the local level.
In the pilot tests, an attempt was made to simplify the exercise
by defining output in terms of number of beneficiaries/clients served
by type of service (health, social welfare, day care centers). It was
found that not all LGUs gather and record this kind of information.
For instance, data on number of clients served per type of social
service were not easily accessible in Trece Martirez City, Davao City,
Antique Province, and Davao del Norte Province. Moreover, for
LGUs that do maintain records, there is a great deal of unevenness
in the coverage of beneficiary/client information that LGUs monitor.
This is particularly ti'ue for health services which range from prenatal
care, to medical attendance in child birth, to post natal care, to
immunization, to micronuta'ient supplementation, and the like which
are at times delivered to the same individual at the same time.
Because of these difficulties, this Study opted not to use efficiency
measures of LGU service delivery.
Beneficiaries' Satisfaction Rate
...... •.... _J • . Undoubtedly, measuring the extent of benehclarle_, satisfaction
with specified social services provided by LGUs is one of the more
accurate ways to assess the effectiveness of LGU performance in
service delivery. The present study pilot tested this approach using
a questionnaire developed for the purpose (Appendix 1).
Specifically, residents (household heads) were asked about their
awareness of, utilization of, and satisfaction with: hospital services180[ JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
provided by the provincial government; disaster management and
social welfare services given to street children and abused/battered
women provided by the provincial government; health services
provided by the rural health units and barangay health stations of
city/municipal governments; and services of daycare centers
operatedby city/municipal governments. Residents were also asked
about their satisfaction/dissatisfaction with overall management
by the local government. The cost of gathering data using
attitudinal/perception surveys is considerably higher compared
with other approaches which make use of administrative data.
ServiceAdequacy
To address this problem, Strategic Objective II may alternatively
be measured by evaluating the effectiveness of basic social services
delivered using data from administrative reports (Figure 2). As such,
it may be broken down into two result packages. One, effectiveness
in service delivery may be measured in terms of the adequacy of
services provided. Two, LGU performance in service delivery may
also be gauged by the presence of systems which allow LGUs to access
increased resources through stronger linkages with central
government agencies. On the one hand, service adequacy may be
measured by the extent to which LGUs have been able to comply
with standards/benchmarks in the programming of service delivery
inputs for social services. In general, such standards may be set in
terms of the ratio of the number of target clientele (or LGU
population) to the number of government personnel. In particular,
this study compared the actual population-to-doctor ratio with the
national benchmark of 20,000 population per government physician;
the actual population-to-nurse ratio with the national benchmark
of 20,000 per government nurse; the actual population-to-midwife
ratio with the national benchmark of 5,000 population per
government midwife; and the actual number of children aged 3-5
per day care worker with national standard of 150 children per
government day care worker.MANASAN, GONZALEZ & GAFFUD : INDICATORS OFGOODGOVERNANCE 181
On the other hand, a strong vertical linkage with central
government agencies may be indicated by the presence of
agreements for central-local cooperation in service delivery. 9 These
agreements are mostly in the form of cost-sharing schemes that
address the following weaknesses: limited LGU tax base,
inappropriate expenditure and tax assignments, the coflapse of
common standards (e.g., in health), inefficiencies arising from
interjurisdictional spillovers, economic instability, and regional
variations in net fiscal benefits.
Strong linkages with central government agencies can help
reduce fiscal imbalances and, in the process, can release more
resources for increased local effort in social development.
Central-local coordination is also needed to avoid piecemeal
approaches and minimize regional and local differences in the
quality of services (e.g., education, health). Since many social
services are public goods (the benefits of which are largely
nonexcludable), local governments hardly have any incentive to
increase their social budgets.
Matching grants and cost-sharing schemes between various
levels of government are, thus, crucial in influencing local priorities
in sectors of high national but low local priority (e.g., public health,
environment). Sound intergovernmental mechanisms, ff in place,
can help enhance the availability and accessibility of social services
atthe LGU level.
International donors are implicitly included in this index. Note
that the cen_al government always has to step in as guarantor and
project manager of donor-funded undertakings, even if the donor
9 Because the measurement of this indicator is limited to a presence/absence tally (i.e., an
LGU is given a score of I if it has entered into any LGU-NGA arrangement and a score of 0
otherwise), it does not capture the size, diversRy, quality nor the extent of progress in
collaboration. Forinstance, Cavite's cost sharein its Comprehensive Health CareAgreement
with DOH has been declining and the question is whether it stillmerits a score of1. Size and
diversity is another contentious problem: is a water supply project equivalent to a daycare
center project? A good alternative would be an index wherein local residents are presented
with a list of programs and asked to indicate their priorities and see how the LGU-NGA
collaborative agreements alecongruent withthese priorities. Butthat is another story.182[JOURNALOF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
has specifically targeted an LGU as loanorgrantbeneficiary. This
stemsfrom thelackofsovereign character ofLGUs, making them
ineligible tonegotiate loansdirectly with bilateral or multilateral
agencies.
In sum, two alternative ways of delineating the result
package/s for Strategic Objective II are suggested. The first one
makes use of public opinion surveys and defines Strategic Objective
II in terms of the benej_ciaries"net satisfaction with specified social services
delivered by LGUs (Figure 1).
In contrast, the second one makes use of administrative data
and defines Strategic Objective Ii in terms of (1) the adequacy of services
provided and (2) the presence of a strong vertical linkage with national
government agencies (Figure 2).
Strategic Objective III. Accountability
Following the framework on accountability provided by the
World Bank (1992) and Paul (1991), this study breaks down overall
accountability into macro-level accountability and micro-level
accountability.
Macro-level accountability
There is no such thing as an invisible hand in local governance.
Institutional checks and balances are required to optimize the range
of opportunities open to local businesses, NGOs, and the LGUs
themselves.
On one side of the equation is the need for restraint. LGUs must
have the capacity to enforce rules and regulations that govern both
market and civil society transactions. Such rules prevent the abuse
of power, keep LGUs honest by reducing transactions costs, establish
credible controls over the LGUs' use of inputs, and hold local
managers accountable for the attainment of measurable outcomes.
As such, macro-level accountability relies on formal instruments of
constraints, which are anchored in key institutions, like accounting
and auditing. Disclosure requirements add to the transparency
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On the other side of the equation is the need for flexibility. It
may be that auditing standards are outdated and put too much
restraint on discretionary authority. Or, oversight from central
agencies- such as the Commission on Audit (COA) - may rely too
much on rule-based compliance at the expense of the ability to be
flexible. Sometimes, innovations that lead to high-quality service
at less cost to citizens may come at the expense of COA violations.
While there is a need to reduce opportunities for corruption,
dysfunctional rules that impede the wise exercise of discretionary
authority may actually backfire. A continuing challenge is to set
rules that allow LGUs to utilize a toolkit of innovative and flexible
measures, but embed their decisionmaking in processes that allow
for auditing and oversight from the community and from central
agencies.
Having said this, however, it still remains that the presence of a
strong external audit system system is critical in ensuring macro-
level accountability. For purposes of this study, financial
accountability is indicated by the results of the financial and
compliance audit of LGU accounts and operations by the COA. 1°
Initially, it was thought that the summary result of the COA
audit (which indicates whether the auditor assigned to the LGU
rendered a favorable, adverse qualified or no opinion as to the
fairness of LGU accounts) might be used to reflect LGU performance
relative to the external audit. However, a closer scrutiny of the COA
audit reports for the pilot LGUs revealed that there are
inconsistencies among the auditors' over-all evaluation and their
significant findings and recommendations. Thus, what one auditor
would rate as fair, another auditor would just as likely grade
unfavorably.
The inconsistencies refer not only to the presence/absence of
documentary evidence but also to the magnitude of exposure to
10Tile focus of the financial and compliance audit is on the validity and the propriety of
transactions and fairness of accounts presentation.184 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
"inappropriate transactions." For instance, the auditor of Hamtic,
Antique rendered a favorable opinion on the financial statements
of the municipality for 1996 despite the absence of a year-end trial
balance and physical inventory of assets. In contrast, the auditor of
Noveleta, Cavite rendered a qualified opinion on the fairness of the
financial statements presented due to lack of physical inventory of
its properties even ifthe said LGU submitted a year-end trial balance.
Similarly, the auditor of Davao Oriental rendered a qualified
opinion on the LGU's financial statements since the proince had
disallowances amounting to P1.65 million and unliquidated cash
advances amounting to P0.9 million. On the other hand, the auditor
of Antique gave an adverse opinion on the LGU's financial
statements because of unliquidated cash advances amounting to P3.4
million even though the LGU had no disallowances. Given these
considerations, this study proposes to measure audit accountability
by comparing the magnitude of current year's disallowances with LGU
total income.
Micro-level accountability
Paul (1991) posited that micro-level accountability results from
(1) the ability and willingness of the public to use "voice," i.e., to
exert pressure on service providers to perform well, and (2) the ability
and willingness of the public to "exit" in favor of alternative
suppliers when dissatisfied with a public service.
Participatory mechanisms allow local governments to get a wide
consensus on local issues and the necessary commitment to intervene
quickly and flexibly. They also permit those outside the local
government to restrain its actions while making the LGU more
responsive to people's needs and preferences. For local managers,
the central challenge is finding ways to combine technical expertise
with political legitimacy, which requires making decisions with deep
regard for community concerns.
Yet, even if the LGU has the people's interest at heart, it is
unlikely to understand what the people's needs are in the absence
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to listen, it will not be responsive to the diffused interests of the
community, especially those of the minorities (urban poor, farmers,
fisherfolk, indigenous cultural communities and women) who
usually do not have a strong voice to articulate their demands.
Consultative processes offer civil society opportunities to provide
inputs, and to take the burden off the LGU by involving communities
in the oversight functions. True, getting feedback tends to slow
down decisionmaking, but the lack of it can be destabilizing as it
decreases trust and confidence in the local government and weakens
its ability to gain broad agreements on expenditure priorities, social
development programs, and environmental management.
There are two alternative ways to measure the extent of citizen
participation in LGU affairs. One way is through the use ofexperiential
surveys whereby residents are asked about their participation in
NGOs and barangay affairs; and their perception of NGO/barangay
influence in LGU affairs. The other way is by evaluating the extent of
participation of NGO orprivate sector representatives in local specialbodies
through the use of administrative data. Both of these alternatives were
considered inthis study.
In the first instance, perception measures were constructed.
Samples of citizens were asked the extent to which they participated
in NGOs and barangays, or the extent to which they (through the
barangays or NGOs) are able to influence local decisionmaking
(Appendix 1). The choice of NGOs and barangays is not accidental.
NGOs are civil society structures that interface with LGUs on a
diversity of issues. Barangays are the lowest-level governmental
structures under the jurisdiction of municipal-/dty-level local
governments. It is through the barangays that citize_as are able to
make direct contact with their local governments. NGOs and
barangays are, thus, the key links that could ensure that LGUs arrive
at accountable decisions in a transparent manner.
Citizens' participation and citizens' empowerment indices are
complementary indices. Participation alone does not guarantee
political efficacy. A weak civil society, and a barangay system quite186 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
beholden to local authorities only transform participation into co-
optation. To gauge whether barangays and NGOs act as political
pressure groups, the extent of their influence over LGU affairs must
also be taken into consideration.
Together, participation and empowerment would adequately
portray the effectiveness of citizen oversight. These two sets of
indicators provide crucial feedback to guide government response
to the demand and complaints of its clients. In this sense, NGOs
and barangays help to hold LGUs fully accountable to the public
they serve.
In the second instance, the extent of citizen participation in LGU
affairs may be measured by comparing the actual number of NGOs
represented in the various local special bodies (namely: the Local
Development Council, the Local Health Board, the Local School
Board, and the Pre-qualificati0n Bids and Awards Committee) with
the number prescribed under the Local Government Code. While
this set of indicators is relatively easy to measure, it may yield
ambiguous indicators of participation to the extent that NGOs may
have been captured by political leaders and/or government
bureaucrats.
Exit mechanisms are just as important as voice mechanisms in
ensuring micro-level accountability. Exit mechanisms are those that
promote a more competitive environment in service delivery. In
this study, the presence of exit mechanisms in LGU delivery of social
services is indicated by the presence of any one of the following
innovative service delivery mechanisms at the LGU level:
management contract, BOT, engagement of NGO/PO in service
delivery. Defined as such, this indicator does not explicitly consider
the relative significance of innovative social service delivery
mechanisms that are in place or the quality of the service involved.
To summarize, Strategic Objective III is supported by two result
packages: macroeconomic accountability and micro-level
accountability. Macro-level accountability is measured by therelative
size of COA disallowances. On the other hand, micro-level
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mechanisms. The presence of exit mechanisms is indicated by the
use ofany one of various market-oriented￿innovative mechanisms in service
&livery in the LGU. On the other hand, the presence of voice
mechanisms is measured by two alternative indicators. The first
one makes use of public opinion surveys and refers to (1) citizens'
participation in NGOs and barangays and (2) citizens' perceptions of the
empowerment of NGOs and barangays (Figure 1). The second one
makes use of administrative data and refers to the participation of
NGO representative in local special bodies (Figure 2).
Quantification and Measurement
Overall, the performance indicators chosen are broad enough
to be adaptable in most local settings. The tradeoff is loss of
specificity, since LGUs differ markedly in terms of both their
institutional capabilities and their stTucmres. As a whole, the indices
may not be able to reflect these differences. However, some of the
indicators may be able to capture specific functions that are unique
to a particular level of government. For instance, the net satisfaction
rate for health services is defined with reference to hospital services
in the case of provincial governments and with reference to primary
health services delivered by rural health units (RHUs) and barangay
health stations (BHSs) in the case of city/municipal governments.
The indicators are straightforward and user-friendly
(understandable to users). They, also, readily yield to measurement.
This is particularly true of the indicators presented in Figure 2. The
indicators are not intensive in their requirements for information
and can be easily monitored.
It is not expensive to set the system. When perception surveys
are used, the cost of data collection, although much higher, is still
reasonable. Multistage sampling provides a way to cut cost.
Before constructing the overall governance index as well as the
composite indices for each of the three Strategic Objectives, the
indices of each of the performance indicators were first modified in
two ways. One, all indices were defined in such a way that higher
numbers represent better governance. Two, all indices were re-188 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
scaled such thattheyall _range from 0 toI. Fortherevenueeffort
index, thecost recovery index, percapita social service expenditure
index,and social service expenditureratio, the re-scaling was
achieved by dividing theactual figures by twice therelevant national
average. Thisimplies that when an LGU's performanceisequalto
thenational average, it gets ascore of0.5. To illustrate, local revenue
effort indexisdefined as:
loc rev eff indexj = min ( 1, total loc revi / popn t )
2 *natl ave per pax loc rev
where total loc rev irefers to total local source revenue of LGU i;
popni refers to population of LGU i;
natl ave per pax loc rev refers to the national averageper
capita local source revenue.
On the other hand, the index for the adequacy of service inputs
is defined as:
natl stud
serv inp adeq indexi = rain (1, (no trgt clntQ/(act no persniQ )
where natl stnd refers to the national benchmark_
no trgt clnt_ refers to the actual number of target clientele
in LGU i;
act no persnl_ refers to the actual number of relevant
personnel in LGU i.
COA audit index_ = 1- (amt disallow___z )
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Similarly, the COA audit index is defined as:
if amt disallow i< tot expdi and
COA audit index, = 1
if amt disallow_ > tot expd_and
where tot expdIrefers to total expenditure of LGU i in the
current year;
amt disallow_ refers to amount of current year
disallowances of LGU i.
Also, the NGO participation index is defined as:
NGO part indext = min ( 1,act no NGO rep,)
prescr no,
where act no NGO repi refers to actual number of NGO
representative in specified local special body of LGU i;
prescr no_refers to prescribed number of NGO
representative in specified local special body of LGU i.
The formulas for each of the indices are summarized in
Appendix 3.
The overall governance quality index (GQI) constructed for this
study'was derived by consolidating (1) the composite indices for
each of the three Strategic Objectives and (2)the composite indices
for each of the Result Packages. The overall governance quality index
as well as the composite indices for the Strategic Objectives and the
Result Packages were aggregated by assigning equal weights for
each of their respective components. "Equal weighting means that
potential biases or errors do not unduly influence the composite
index" (Huther and Shah 1998).190 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
Results of Pilot Tests
Two sets of indices were computed for the nine pilot LGUs. The
first set made use of a combination of administrative data and
information from public opinion surveys following the framework
provided in Figure 1 (Table 1). In contrast, the second set relied
exclusively on administrative data following the framework outlined
in Figure 2 (Table 2).
In principle, version I of the indices provides a more accurate
measure of the various performance indicators since good
governance is dependent on beneficiaries :' satisfaction with LGU
services and their perception of how well they are able to influence
LGU policies and actions. However, the data requirements for
version 2 indices are relatively more accessible and, therefore,
cheaper to collect) 1
On the whole, the ranking of the governance quality index
derived in this study appears to be consistent with the ranking of
the HDI. LGUs which register higher HDIs tend to perform better,
too, in terms of the overall governance index. This is particularly
true at the provincial level (Figure 3).12 The same finding holds
whether one is looking at version 1 or version 2 of the GQI. The
rankings of the LGUs remain the same, although version 2 of the
GQI tends to be higher compared with version I (Figure 4).
At the same time, the beneficiaries' net satisfaction rate with
social services (SOII1) is largely consistent with the social service
delivery effectiveness index when it is measured using
administrative data (SOII2) which is a composite of service input
adequacy and LGU-NGA cooperation index. The fit is not perfect
but the relationship between the alternative performance indicators
for Strategic Objective II appears to be fairly strong (Figure 5).
I'LIt is estimated that at least P30million is needed for a fairly credible public opinion survey
(with 400 respondent per LGU) if the governance index is to be measured for all provinces
and cities, On the other hand, the cost of the version 2 index for the same coverage is in the
P1-2 million range only,
12Note that the HDI estim_ltes are available at the p!'ovincial level only.MANASAN, GONZALEZ & GAFFUD •INDICATORS OFGOODGOVERNANCE[ 191
In contrast, the beneficiaries' participation in NGOs/barangays
and their perception of the empowerment of NGOs/barangaYs do
not correlate well with NGO representation in local special bodies
(Figure 6). Moreover, there is very little variability in version 2 of
the participation index compared with its counterpart in version 1.
Note that version 2 of the participation index tends to cluster in the
0.95=1.0 range regardless of level of government. These findings
lend some credence to anecdotal evidence that the spirit of NGO
participation in local special bodies has not been upheld in many
instances. In essence, it appears that version 2 of the participation
index is not able to adequately capture the quality of citizens'
participation although it is able to provide some indication of its
quantity.
INSTITUTIONALIZATION ISSUES
Indicators of good governance serve as an important yardstick
in evaluating the performance of governments, in general, and LGUs,
in particular, as they pursue the goals of sustainable human
development. They form part of the development framework for
charting the progress of the government's human development
efforts at the local level, taking into consideration the limitations
facing LGUs as well as the opportunities available to them.
Through these indicators, LGU performance can be reviewed
and compared with one another in any given time period to identify
both problem areas and best practice. The performance measures
may also be compared with performance targets or standards. At
the same time, the performance of a specific LGU or group of LGUs
may likewise be compared from period-to-period to track progress
and, possibly, establish trends. Implicit in this statement is the need
to have periodic measurement of progress towards the attainment
of explicit objectives and goals.
The indicators of good governance proposed in this study can
be used in a variety of ways. In very broad terms, indicators of
good governance may be used to clarify LGU goals and objectives.
The measurement of these indicators may focus greater attention inTable 1. Governance Index, Version I
Cavite Anbque DavaoNrte13 Madirm Davao Noveleba SanJose Hamfi¢ Mabini
Province Pm_nce Province C_ly • City Cavile Antique Antique DavaoNrte
I. Opgm_ed Resource S_pporf Index - SOil 0.888 0.5f9 ........ 0.-° 5-87 0.838 0.3S2 0.518 O.S09 0.293 0.407 Z,_
I.f. Revenue _ Index 0.491 0.362 0.489 0,815 0.347 0,825 0.553 0.195 0.233
O
Lt.i. 0.889 0.353 0.607 0.722 0.263 0,649 0.562 0.149 0.445 LocalRevenue Elfolt Index
L1.1. CostRecovery Index 0.093 0.371 0,37t 0,809 0.431 1,000 0.544 0.240 0.021 _
t.2 .ResourceL,_z._'/o_ ,ttm_ex 0.573 0.696 0.273 0,698 0.208 0,410 0.475 0.483 0.487 L"--'
- O
L2.1, SocialSer_ce F_.xper_ture Index 0,545 0.745 0.259 1.000 0.200 0,373 "0,4t3 0.408 0.482 _'J
L2.2. Social Sen_e ExpenditureRatio Index 0,60", 0.646 0,286 0.396 0.216 0.447 0,538 0.559 0.492
L3. Sustainable Resoume Generat_ru_J_lizationIndex 1,000 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.500 0,500 0.500 0.500 0.500 _-_
IL3.1. Regularityof Conduc_. of Gena, ralRevisionIndex 1.000 0.000 1.000 _ r_ 0._
1"3"2 Presence,of Annual Devetopcnent Plan 1,000 1.000 1,000 1 r000 1.000 1,000 1,000 1.000 1.000 *_,
BI EffecUveness/Efficiency JnSociat Sen/Jce Oeiivery lndex- S0#1 0,595 0.315 0.565 0.880 0,920 O,8FD 0.645 0.570 0.535
U.f. Ben_Tciar_.s'Naf_Rafew_thSpecifiedSocialService 0,595 0.315 0_565 0.880 0.920 0.8,90 0,645 0.570 0.535
ILI.1. Net SetJ_ Rale ,,_th HospitalService 0.400 .-0.030 0.490
O
IL1.2, Net Satisfactk)nRaW_th DLsaster ManaoemanlJC, II',efSocialWe_fareServtce 0.79C, 0,660 0.640
IL1.3. Net SatisfactionR..a_, w_thRHUIBHS 0.850 0.960 0,820 0.640 0.330 0.570
ti,1.4. Net Sabalac_J0[rt Rale with DaycareCente_ 0.910 0.880 0,960 0.650 0.810 0.500
Z
UL OvamH Account_abitity Index - SO_l 0.873 0.921 0.580 0.650 0.879 0.920 0.92_ 0.858 0.859 _--_
#Lf. Mao,o.-teve/_//,l'y Jrndex 1,000 1.000 1000 0.991 0.863 1.000 t.00D 1,000 0,991
///,2. _D4evelAc_ou_lndex 0,745 0.841 0,32t 0,310 0,794 0.640 0.853 0.331 0.326
gL2.1, Voice thdm( 0,490 0.683 0,643 0,620 0,588 0.280 0.705 0.663 0.653
llL2.1.eL _s's Par_dpation kKlex 0.490 0.665 0.650 0.620 0.345 0.280 0.630 0.700 0.700
tlt.2.l.a.i. Ci_ze_s' Part_c_oa_o_ Rate in NGOs 0.490 0.420 0.520 0.620 0.120 0.280 0.390 0.450 0.620
|H.2.1.b_-_._ Padic_3ation Ratein 8aran_ys 0.490 0,910 0.780 0.620 0.570 0.280 0.870 0.950 0.780
III.Zl.b. Citizens' Empowenne_ Index 0.480 0.700 0.635 0,620 0.830 0,290 0.780 0.625 0.605
111.2.1.a.(,,Ol_en_" Pe,'cep_onof Empowenmant of NGOs 0,490 0,590 0.660 0,620 0.830 0,280 0.710 0.480 0.650
111-2.1_.,_.Cibzena'Percep_o_of E_ of Sorangays 0,490 0,810 0.6_0 0,620 0,830 0,280 0,850 0.770 0.560
illJ2.2 ExitIndex 1.000 1.ODD 0.000 0.000 1,000 1.000 1.000 0.0CO 0.000Table 2. Govemance Index, Version 2
Cavito Antique DavaoNrte t3 M_I_'o; Davoo Novei'eto San 3ose Horatio
Province Province Province City City Cavite Ar_iqce AnHque Dsvao Nrt(
1i O_m_N_d,_nou_ S_oponfnd_ - SOI2 0._6 0.6t9 0.687 0.S36 0.3S2 0.745 0.676 0.869 O, Irll
tf. Revenue Gene,,'a_on Index O.491 0.362 0.409 0.915 0.347 0.825 0.553 0.180 0.233
O
L1.t. local RevenueElfo_ index 0.889 0.353 0.607 0,722 0.263 0.649 0.562 0.149 0.445
LILt. CostI_ Index 0.093 O.371 0.371 0.909 0.431 1.000 054,4 0+240 0.02t
0.673 0.696 0.273 0.698 0.208 0.410 0.475 0.483 0.467 L2 Resoa_e /ndex
1.2.1. SociidStm_:e _ Index 0.548 0.745 0.266 1.000 0,200 0.373 0.413 0,408 0.482 _o
L2.2. So(dalServiceExpendik.uoRaSoIndex O601 0.646 0.286 0.396 0.216 0.4,47 0.536 0.559 0.492
L3, Sus'_'na_e Resoz_ Genelr_ _rnd_ 1.000 0.500 i.000 1.0O0 0,500 1,000 1.(XX) 1,000 1.000
L3.1. Regality of Conducto_General Re_s_onInd_ 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000
1.3.2_ _ o_Annu_ Dd,_pmont Plan 1._0 1.000 1.000 1.0_0 1.0_0 1.000 1.0_0 1.000 1.000
Dogvery Index -SO/Q 0.703 O.SO0 0.930 t.0_ 0,746 0.98(I 0.8¢4 0.943 _002 & E/_c_A_mo_J_.tency In Social
#.1. A_F.,acy of So_vceInputs Index 0.566 1.000 0.860 1.0_0 0.490 0.772 0,726 0.807 0.725 _:
d IL1.1. Popula_o_to DoctorRa_o 0.350 1,0_O 0,719 t.0(X) 0.327 0.894 0.456 0.548 0.653 k..im'
11.1.2. Po_ toN_rse Raf_o 0.762 1.000 1.000 t.000 0.6_3 0.694 0.456 1_000 0.653
it.1.3. Populat_n toM_iw_fe R_o I ._00 0.204 1.000 I ,_00 1,000 0.980
E
II.1,4. Cl'=ldrenAgod3-.5to Dayc_e ',/V_ter Rado 1.000 0.658 0.701 1.000 1.000 0.612 ___
1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1,000 1.000 1,000 1.000 1.000 ft.2, LGU-NGA _ndex
_L OveragAccoun_Mf_yb_'ex - S0_2 _,000 0.993 0.750 0.733 0°$82 0,980 0.990 0.760 0,738
t/t.1. _v__/nde_ 1.000 t.000 1.000 0.99! 0.963 1.000 1.000 1.0(X) 0.801
III.Z Af_o,4ev_' Ac_oun_dy/n alex_ 1,000 0.885 0.500 0.475 1.000 0.960 0,gSO 0,500 0.485
111.2.1, Voice 5ndex 1.000 0.970 1.000 0,950 1,0_0 0,920 0.960 1,000 0.970
Z
Ilt.2.1._L NGO reprene_aSoninLocal Development_ 1.[XX} 0,880 1,000 0,800 1.000 0.680 0,840 1,IXX) 0_880
gL2.1.b. NGO _o_esenlat/on inLocal Ftea_ 8oard 1.000 1.000 1.000 %000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1,000 1.000 L"4'3
111.2.1 .¢, NGO _0_-esentationinLocal Scho_ Board "_.000 "=.000 '_.000 1.000 "f.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
111.2. l.d NGO relx"*,,=,e,'i_ 5or_in PBAC 1.000 1.000 '_ .0OD 1.I[X_0 1,0(_. 1.(X_O 1.000 1.000 1.000
111.2,2, ExitIndex 1.Clio 1,0013 0.0]30 O.(X)O 1.000 1,0_0 1.000 0,000 0,0000
9oo l m 9 _ _
O. O. _ ,
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specifying the critical components of good governance (Cook et al.
1993). They can be used to guide the local budget process, to improve
service deiivery (either in terms of modes of delivery or in terms of
functions), to enhance accountability by easing access to information
on the part of local communities, to "introduce the discipline of
relevant benchmarking/' and to improve the morale of LGU officials
and personnel.
LGU governance indicators will be helpful to LGU officials
themselves to the extent that the indicators can be used to call
attention to potential implementation problems as well as the need
for new policy directions. These indicators will also be valuable to
the national government agencies in providing information that will
enable them to better target their technical assistance activities in
terms of both content and target clientele23 More importantly,
performance indicators will be useful to civil society by providing
information that may better guide collective choice and action.
There is no doubt, therefore, that there is a need to measure the
governance index on aperiodic basis. In the regional and national
consultations conducted in the course of this study, there was a
consensus that the governance quality index should be measured
regularly, possibly once every three years. Being able to gauge the
performance of the LGU during the term of incumbent officials (as
differentiated from previous officials) appears to be a major concern.
Given this perspective, most of the participants in the consultations
agreed that the best time to measure the governance index is at the
middle of each term of LGU officials.
The next question is who should take on the task of measuring
the governance quality index? This is a sensitive matter for two
reasons. Fh'st, the chosen institution should be credible to the various
stakeholders: LGU officials, centTal government bureaucrats, NGOs/
POs, and local constituents. Any loss in the credibility of the
sponsoring agency would seriously undermine the usefulness of
the index. This can happen if the rating institution introduces
systematic bias in the measurement process. Second, the designated
institution should have the capability to undertake the measurementMANASAN, GONZALEZ & GAFFUD •INDICATORS OFGOODGOVERNANCE] 199.
of the index. In this case, local presence would be a crucial
component of capability.
The likely candidate institutions include the League of
Provinces/Cities, oversight national government agencies, a
confederation of NGOs, or consortium of academic institutions. The
League of LGUs has the advantage of being broad-based in the sense
that they have local chapters. However, the League, at this point in
time, is not adequately staffed to engage in an exercise of this nature.
Then, too, the League can easily be accused, fairly or unfairly, of
being partisan.
The Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), the
National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) or the
Commission on Audit (COA) is possible institutional home for the_
measurement of the governance quality index. However, LGUs may
not take kindly to having any central government agency rate their
performance. Such an arrangement may be perceived as running
counter to the spirit of greater local autonomy. Moreover, these
institutions may be seen by some of the stakeholders as either being
too rules-oriented or under-staffed at the regional level to be credible
in undertaking such an innovative exercise.
Local NGOs and local academic institutions appear to have the
advantage of not only being credible but also of having enough local
presence to make the effort less costly. Between these two groups,
the latter has the additional advantage of possessing some of the
technical preparation and discipline required for this activity.
However, the former has the advantage of having the missionary
zeal and commitment that may be necessary in making the
undertaking a success. .
In the final analysis, a four-cornered collaborative agreement
involving key national government agencies, the League of LGUs,
NGOs, and local academic institutions may be the most appropriate
institutional arrangement for the measurement of the governance
quality index. Such an arrangement will allow these institutions to
capitalize on each other's strengths and compensate for each other's
weaknesses.200 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
SUGGESTED FUTURE REFINEMENTS
The following suggestions have been raised for consideration
in future efforts to refine the governance quality index as it is defined
in the present study: _3
* Inclusion of some measure of the quality of the electoral
process/participation at the local level in the governance quality
index.
- Introduce output indicators which may be available from in
the MBN indicator system (like the number of fully immunized
children, number of pregnant women given tetanus toxoid
vaccine, number of deliveries attended by medical personnel,
number of moderately/severely malnourished children, and
number of children aged 3-5 attending day care centers) in lieu
of the service input indicators that are now part of SOII2_4
. Review of the specific social services that LGUs deliver on a_
regular basis so that the indicators are defined in terms of the
same.
o Inclusion of indicators of LGU performance in the conduct
of itsregulatory functions as well as in the delivery of services
other than social services (like agricultural services, and
infrastructure services).
° Give more weight to SOII in the computation of the overall
governance quality index.
o Revisit the primary reason for the measurement of the
governance quality index. It was noted that the governance
quality index may take different forms depending on the end-
13Thesesuggestions were generated when the preliminary output of this study was presented
in four seminars/workshops attended by HDN members, representatives from key national
goven_aent agencies, representatives from the Leagues of LGUs,and members of the Regional
Development Councils in Region Vl and XI.
14If,indeed, these indicators are uniformly measurable across allLGUs, then these will yield
asignificant improvement in the measurement of the governance quality index. The problem
with most MBN indicators stem from the fact that they are measured with reference to a
subset of barangays in the municipality {asopposed to all barangays) raising doubts as to
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use that it is meant to address. For instance, if the index is
intended principally for HDN advocacy then the indicators
should focus on the delivery of priority human development
concerns. In contrast, if it is meant as part of the development
administration toolkit, then it should encompass all LGU
functions including local financial administration, local
development planning, organization and management, local
legislation, local service delivery and regulatory functions.
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Appendix 1, Qu_stionnalre I Survey Instruments




I, SATlSFAC]30N WITH OVIER-_LLMANAGEMENT I, _;ATISFACTIONWITH OVI_R-_LLMANAGEMENT
1. Are yousatislled withthe improvements for the _mmuhlty 1, Nsciyehankaba st=r_ls ps_lbebagonD glnawa nlGOB/
undertakenby thep_cent (GOV/MAYOR's)edmlnistralton? MAYORpare sabuongpmblnsiyalt_yan?
a. GOVERNOR? a. GOBERNOR
b, MAYOR h, MAYOR
It. AWARENES_;/UTILIZATION/E;ATISFACTION WIl1"1 SERVICES iL AWARENESS/UTILIZAllON/SAT15FACT10N VW'II']SERVICe5
FOR CITY/MUNICIPALITY: FOR crib/MUNICIPALITY:
2, Am you swam that theC/TYAMUN Is operWing e health 2, Maymon _ health¢_lter/berangayhealth ung
Cenrer/RHU/BH$? sa inyo_;ilUga_
3. Have you or anymemberOfyourfandlyOvaliseOf 3. ikaw be o'ISBsa rt_lskasomame aa behay sy hake=
Ihe semJr.,eS Offoe heath CentOr/RHURIH$? pagpeoamm nasa healthce/fler/bamngay healthunit?
4. Ifthe answerIn#3 IsYES, Amyou satlsfleO with the 4. Kungaug sagofss _3 elyOQ, nasiyobenks ba_._
r_rvlce you received? serblsyong healthcenter/batsngsyhealthunit?
5. Areyou _wam fontthe cITY/MUN Is providing ,5, May day carecentero'feedingcentersa inyo_l
socialwelfareservices (daycarecenters/feeding centers)? lugar?
6, Have you or shymemberofyourfamilyavailedof 6. Ikaw bao' Isasa m(;/flkssameme sobehayay hakpaasolt
theSaMsoGlal welfarecervices? sa0ay carecenter O*nakepuntasa foedl_l center'/
7, Iftheanswer iht_ ISYEa, Areyousatisfiedwith(he 7, Kangang sagersa _l/fl ay GO,rlas_yahata ke ba =a
serviceyou received? serblsyong 0syCare centarReedlng_aier?
it, Are youaware that the CITY/MUNis provl/flng r& Mayreonba dltosa CITYfMUN hem0e lulong na pa_l
ag_o_eumt ext _'lslm_Services?(farm tectmlcia#s agdkulturaluledeg indyekson psra _a hsyop/tUlO41g ng
assistance,livestock vaccination) tekhlsyan.
9.. HaVeyouor anymember Ofyourfamilysvisledof 9. Ikawbao' IS_sa rag&kasamameca bekey sy
the sakJ agriculturalservices? cekarenggapna ng tulongk_tulednlto?
10. Ifthe answerin _ iSYES,Are yousatisflaCl withthe 10. KungangSagofSe_ ey(30. na_yohsrl ks be ce
service youreceived? tul0ng na iyongnafonggep?
FOR PROVINCE: FOR PROVINCE:
1. Ale youawarethatthePROV ISopereUnga hospital? 11. Mayre00 I:_ulghosl_talni pampubllko _lfo sa Prob_lsiyo?
12, Have you or el_ymemberOfyourfamilyavailS0of 12, IKaW bao' Isan ca _r_lS kesoma mesa behaysy
its_',e_lces ? nakepagpaltmmoldlto?
13. If thesnsv_r In #12 ISYES, Areyou satisfiedwiththe 13. Kungaug cegotSS_12 ay O0, naslyohsn ks ba so
service youreceived? ser'_syong hospital?
14. Areyou awarethatthePROV is provldlrlg Social 14. Mayreo0beltg socialserviceshSIPlnlblgsy ang pamshslanrt
i19 .
Pmbinsiyaruledng 01seater miler pareSan_s n_alanta ng
welfare services?(disastercontrol:aidtotyphoon/flood bagyo/
babeypare _ _e i_ta sa tsnca_Igs0atInakesong
vletlmP#_matchil0reNsbusodwomen/betteredwoman) kebel:_glsn?
1._. Have you or anymemberofyourfamilyavailedof 15. Ikaw bao' IS_Isoage k|sama me ca behsy ey
(hessservices? 0sk_tanggapng gsnlt0f_l urlng tuloug?
lit, IftheansWerIn#1S isYE_, Areyou satisfied v_|lh the lit, Kungaug sabotBe#15 sy OO,nasiyohankebs 68
cer_ce you received? tulongnga, iyongnatenggap?
17. Areyouswam thatthe PROVISpmvldlugugdcultur,_l 17. Meyroonba 0ltomsCITY/MUN na mgatuloug_1
services?(dame|SmVresearchbreedingstations), pang.sgdkulturakstuledUGdame tee01, famnbreeding
station?
1it, Have youor any memberof yourfamilyavailedof lit, Ikaw hs0_ass aa mltakacams me set_hay ay
Ihesold ugdculturisservices? nakMauggedns _1 tulongkatuled nile?
1g, IfmeanswerIn#I 8 IsYES,Are yo_satisfied w_fothe f_, K_ at_ s_ol se #11tay OO,ne_lyshenke pa so
service youreceived? IuisngnB iyong nulsnggsp?
lit, EMPOWERM_NT ill EMPOWERMENY
FOR PROVIN(_B/¢rI"YIMUNICIPALIW: FOR PROVINCE/CITY/MUNICIPALITY:
20. Areyou a member Ofanyorganizationthatwod(afor 20, Ikawbe sy kesepln9 Isougsumshsnnil tumutul_mgpars
people'srightsanddevelopmer,? Isulongling kaunl(Irenlit ksrepatsnngage ms_meysn?
21. DOyO_J think LGUrespondsto thesuggesllons/demangs 2f. as palags'ybyeb8 syilnutugunsh_1 pamehslaeng
of youroi_aniz_lon? Ioksleng lnyongsuhestiyoNkehUlngen?
22. Have the LGUOff|daissoughtyouropinionson ongoing 22. HIMhlnglbang age IOkelne oplsyatsag In),Or_o_nyo,'zukof
prejecls? am kanllangn'_lSproy_kfo?
23, Do you =ttsn0cemmunity/barsngaymaeltnga? 2:3, Oumepaloks bang 11_/fl I_lloogSeInyoug
D._'sngay/komunided?
24. DOyouthink LGUrespondstotbe sugge_tlons/demeeds 24, aa palsgsy 'ayepa sy tlnutugunanSagIOyOilg suhestiyoN
ofthe berengaylcemmurdty? kehllingansamlta pulohgns _tO?
25. Have you participatedincommuhityprojects? 25. Neklldiehok ku bass II1QS pmy_kfosa Inyong luhs_
Whatire these preJeds? Anu,ene ang age pmyeklongtee?
28. AreyOUIndl.ed tOsppP0sch theGOV, |orpenaonslfavor? 26, Kung r_angsngallsngltn kit,islsl_ ka ba kayGOaERNOR
pare humullngng peraoi_sl foV_
27. Areyeu Indlnedto sppfosehtheMAYOR forpemmml 27, Kungns_Isogallengan ks, lalspn ks ba kayMAYOR favor?






L _AT_FACTtOtdW_THOVI_R'ALLM-MdAGEM I=NT t, SATtSF#,CTK)NWITHO_q_R-AU,.MAHAGEMENT
1, NakordentoKamensan'_la pegpeg-onga gihkl_ nl 1. Nalll_y ks ba setoga ba_Q_l glnlmonl Gobamoo1V_ycx
Gob/Mayor pera
i_Inl sa bug-osage peo_n_yl)_llnwa? sa tll_ok piol_nwJyal lute?
s, GOIBIERNOR 8, GOBERNOR
O, MAYOR b. MAYOR
It. AWAREI_ES_,_JTn.JzAllOIg/eA'nSFADTION'V_'l_.I_ER'_qCF.5 it. AWARENEaSJ_JTtLtZAYtOWUAT_FACTt_HdW_14SERVtCF-._
FOR CITY/MUNIGIPALITY: FOR CII"WMUNICIPALITYz
Nukahlbaloba rr_ r_;lan_y healthsanlerCsamngayhealth
2, May-eel balebamOrigahoaith ¢entecd)arangay heashunit 2. unit
Iny_ ngs _l)t? sa _ny_ _a_
3, Ikaw baleoIsa sa togaupodmo sepanimalaynaka_vjing 3, II_w bao usa se imongage babamity80 keuban=41 palsy
l_bulOngsi amoage hearth_onter_rang_y h_aithunit'/ naka_tl)mbal naca healthcentePlxirangaybael_itl)olt?
4, Kon sag dabs!sa _1_ ayHU-O, naNl_lya nakuntanloks) man 4, KungangtubasoO, nakontenloo neibay ba mosa ilang
ball)sa nl)s_rblsyO? serb_sy0?
Nkiydey _ c;_Iterbaklo_eedlngc_nter6a inyongngl) Sl Hukabtbaiobe mo _ll) nl)ayday cam careeroffe_Eng cent_
5, lugar?
saInyong luear?
6. Ikawbalml) IsaSel)'lgl)upo4mo sa baoIwletay nakasut00 6, tkl)wbl) ousasa ImooQmgl) kapa_n_yl) ok/Nt]4_n sa baldy
nl)¢,8day cam cenll)re l)8kekdldto sa feedkl_¢_ter? nak_itlfflulos sa maongsl)_l_ye?
7, Konang sabersa 16 ay HU-O, nl)llgyl)l)nl)lumtentoks)ml)n 7, Kungang tubaOO. eakontentoon_dlpay ba mosa lane
ball) casertdsyosal)gii)yOday camcentetffeedlng? sarb_syo?
it. May ;Ira _ dinca InyoslytKledrl_mWa sangballs pang. it, Nakahlbaioba 111o nga BrigInyo_l lungsodomuolslpye
l)gtikuiturat_l_Osang Ih"ty_on pare sa mgabayo_ n_l)bata9 ng tabea'_9 el)I_mg-um_, O Bg_-,uitumt e_d,m'_
buli_sangleknlsyan? servicessame safam'itl)PJll)l_an's lutsJstl)n_no iNe_lon pa
sa mgahayop?
9. tkl)Wball)e Isa sa'mgl)UpOdmosa penlml)ioynekapeton 9. Ikawbao usa saleeDS mgl) kapamllya o kaubansapalsy
na sangsIN l)0l) bulls? nakapahlmuioS Samaongas)baD9 pang-uma?
1O, Konann sat)atsa#9 iy HU-O, l)l)lipayonakuntehleks) man 1O, Kungangtubl)gDO, nalipyae nekuntentobams)u Ill)l)g
hnio sa bullgrigameOf)baton? sarbieyo?
FOR PROVINCE: FOR PROVINCE:
11, Ml)y-l)ra bale nga baspitl)lpampuldlkodidsa proPansya? 11. Nl)kl)hlbl)loba mongl) el)Byhospitalsa Inyongpral_nslya?
1:2, tk_b_dlo|sasa¢_leu!:=odmosapaokl_alsynska_gll)e 1Z, ik_lwbaousasak_longmgakap01Uyl)ekuubansapelay
pebulengdlo'tl)? nakapagtl)mabalnitmaongIloepital?
13. Konangsabatsa#12ayHLkO, nl)llpeyonakuntentebaman 13, KungangtubagOO, nakomaMl)onatipaybamosaltl)Og
ball)_l liesarbL_yo? sarbleyo?
t4. M_yerai_io_x_leervk_sngl)OlohetagangOobyemo_lng 14, Nakahlball)bamongaanglnyoogproblnslyanl)gl)itl)legng
Pmbineyl)katuledsang l_llg baresa toganaitl)lltl)nsang sa¢ll)lweffl)mservicessemi) sa tabangpare el) togaI_ktlmi
baldy124reel)mrs palapap-ioitOy ukonwelB.1_ malsteran bebae, l)tc.?
nee itl)batsan ukonbaresa togaInab.,.._o _gl) kababall)l)l)?
1,5, Ikawball) l) leasa mgl)upodmosa panlmaioyel)ks)baton el) S 15. Ik_,' b8 oida sa imel)gtool) kabamityl)0 kl)ubl)nsabelay
l)me t_le Idl)l)esangbatH)? nikebahlmull)s nasa meansmgl) serbisyo?
ld. Konangsabat/llSeyHU-O. oe_pl)yOt_nakurAen_ekaman Id. KurlgangtubagOO, nakl)ntel)tl)bamosalll)ngsafl01_ye? bale
sabulls ngl)leo nab_ton? /
17. Ml)y-l)m bl)ladidsaIoyol)lyudad/sanwnsangmgl)bUtlg 171 Nekahipeio _ monga ang tnyongpmbinsyanl)gehl)tl)gng
bang-l)grlkultl)katuladsan9 _eml)farm.fl)rmbmedlngeta)tiDe? _gtlcullumlse_lces oas)bang peng-l)mnsaml) sagag-dome
ea uml)hl)aoresearchbral)(_ng_tatlone?
lit, Ikaw bl)ll)e Idasamgl) u_ moee psalms)toy,nekabl)ton 18, Ikswbao gsa saleone mgakapl)mllyl)sakapahJmuJos M
,_ =angeml) slnlngl) idl)easang bulig? ml)l)ngl)gd_ufluralservices?
19. 'Kl)n sagsitba_1,5 l)y I-IU-0, natlpeyl)nl)kuntentoks)ml)n ld1 Kungangtubl)g00, na_ontentoba mosa Ilangsarblsyo?
balesa Iml)nl)batl)nngl) bl)llg?
III. BMPOWERMIENT III. EMPOWERMENT
FOR PROVIN(:B/CITYlMUNIGIPALITY: POR PRDVINC_GITYtldUNICIPAIJTY_
20. Mlyembr_ks)ball)sang ISl)ks)l)_anissyonngl) nl)ga build 20. Ikl)w ba uymlyeml_Osamuekiunsangorgl)nlsasyonngal)n(I
pare IIIb-_ IIn_kl)_ew_ll)n kegkara1_l)O can9 tl)_ ukOm _umongt_t_yOp_re st ks_l)w_ll)o _) kMungQdsa rs_l)tlsv_
sangtugsa-tl)gsa?
21. 8aaimplaang, glaal)apat nlitnbaf_8l)i"_lgobye01o-iokl)l 21. Sl) ImotKIbans-bans ohl)nl).sunaang Inyobat_liok,_ nge
ang Inyl)01gl)auhe_lyo_e panugda-l)nukol)itagu=tuhl)n? gobyemenitkl)tul_g sa togaIdnl)hal)Wl)n sa iny_hl)ng
ergl)nlsasyon?
_1 A_ Ioyebats)r.gl) m_e e_yl)kss sa pmblnl)y=uk_r,t_mwl) 22, _ngeye h,_o9 _p_ny_n o.s,dggestto,"t eng l_alao9ob_ma
nl)kl)bu"oikl)l)glayOoplnyonpalls satool) gmyl)ktonga sa Inyopare san_l) an-gainsprojl)OIS?
Wnl)pl)-oDm sa tl)lld?
Nl)gl)-Inntra e nagl)pasalr.op ks)ml)n ball) sa tool)
23. ml)allng/ptJIoT_- • 2_ Nl)gn-adendbe mnOg_nmunity l)batallgyl) meetings?
pulon_l) bagUp_n,tlp00:_l lovebarangl)yl)kumunide_?
24. Konsa ironlane,glneesabat msl) ball)ungInyosuitestlyon 24, as Iml)'yhuna-hunl)nl)g#[ubngbasa nags) 6uggesllono
pl)nugdl),un ukonkagl_sluhl)n l)l) mga meetl_l opulonQ- klnithanglan0n n0 bamngay/¢,omml)mty l)ng Inyongioe_J
puloSg
ukonpaotlponltipon la lays) parangey? el) gobyemn?
2,5. Nl)ge-ugyonka manbl|io _1 mQitI_Oyektoel)II)yongl)lugst? 2,5. Ikl)w bl) sy nakal)l_m/nsksap_sa mQl)pmyektong •
Mgl) l)molea)ngl)pr0yekto? peng.kumunldl)d? Unsangmgl)pmyeklo?
_l. Ks)l) nags)keel)hi)helen Ira,ml)P41l)pit ks)ball)key Oopeml)r 26, KufIQnl)nglnahangll)l) ks),ml)adtoka ba kl)yOob_r pera
perarr_ogl)y_=1,11o9 g4bor l)tmilg? mang_o rKIpersonat_l) t_r_f'/
27, Koognegl)ldol)hl)_llankl),ml)paioIdtkaball)kl)yMityorpam ='7, Kungnl)nglnaheaoll)oks,moadlokabakl)y_layorbam •
ml)ogl)y_bangpatio#" l)hullO? ntl)ngl)yongpersonalngSfl)VO_'/206 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT




Strategic Objective I Strategic Objective II Strategic Objective HI
Optimized Resource Enhanced Effectiveness Support Systems and
Support for Human In Services Delivery Accountability Measures
Priority Concerns Installed
L1 REVENUE Ill OUTPUTS AND INPUT- fILl OPEIIATING AND
GENERATION OUTPUT RATIOS FOR FINANCIAL
1.1.1 TaxEffort BASIC SERVICES ACOUNTABILITY
1.1.2 Growth in Tax II.1.1 Number of Target SYSTEMS DEVELOPED
CoUection Rates in .Clientele Per Facility AND IMFLEMENTED
Relation to Growth in II.1.1.1Health III.l.1 Accounting System
Tax Base Popttlation/RI-IU orBHS Properly Functioning
1.1,3. Ratio of Internally Population/Hospital Beds III.1.2 Integrity of External Audit
Generated Revenue to II.1.1.2 SocialWelfare System Upheld
Total LGU Income Children Aged 3-5/ GI.1.3 Conduct of Public Hearings
1.1.4 Ratio of Local Taxes to Day Care Center BeforePassage of Local
Total LGU Income II,1,2 Number of Target Budget Ordinance
1.1.5 CoUectionEf-ficiency C.fienteleper Technical m.1.4 Ratio of NGO Member to
of RPT Persormel Required Number of
L1.6 Ratio of RPT to Total " If.1.2.1 Health Member inPBAC
Local Revenue Population/Doctor I]I.1.5 Frequency of M_iings of
1.1.7 Ratio of Business Taxes to Popuhttion/Nurse I_AC
Total Local Revenue Population/Midwife
1.1.8 Ratio of Non-Tax , II.1,2,2Social Welfare HI. 2 POLICYAND LEGAL
Revenues to Total ' Population/DSWD FRAMEWORK FOR
LGU Income Worker INNOVATIVE
1.1.9 Ratio of IRA to Total Children Aged 3-5/ RESOURC]BMANAGE-,
LGU income Day Care Worker MBNT AND SERVICES
1.1.10 Ratio of Other National II.1.2,3'Agriculture DELIVERY DEFINED
Allotments (e.g. Share in population/Agricultural AND EIqFORCED
National Wealth, Technician III.2.1 Adoption of Systems for
Tobacco Tax, and II.1.3 Beneficiaries/Technlcal Inter-Local Government
FAGCOR Revenues to Personnel Collaboration
Total LGu Income) II,1,3,1Health III,2,2 Adoption of Systems for
1.1,11 Per Capita Local Clients Served/Doctor LGU-NGA Cooperation
Source Revenue Clients Served/Nurse _Servtce Delivery
ChentsServed/MidwifeMANASAN, GONZALEZ & GAFFUD: INDICATORS.OFGOODGOVERNANCE207
1.1.12 Rallo of LocalSource II.l,3.2SocialWelfare IIL3 MICRO.LBVEL
1_en_to Tote_ LGU CIbmtserv_/DSWD ACCOUNTABKJTY AND
Bxpenditure Technical Personnel TRANSPARENCY
1.1.13 R%,ulari_ in _¢onduct . .I_ollees/Day Care MEASURES IN PLACE
of the C._mered P..evision Worker
ofSchedule of Market III.3.1 Ci_'s Perception of
Values H.2 AWARI_F_S, UTILIZA- LGU Managem(_nt(net
TION_ AND,LEVEL OF 5atisfac_on Rate)
L2 REVENUE SATISFACTION OF I11.3.2 .Citizen's Participation Rate
'LrrlIIZATION B][_IEFICIAR_S WITH a)Part_iFafion in NGOs
1.2.1 Ratio of Total Social SERVICI_ DELIVERED b) Participation in
Exi_mditu_ to Total 0_romthe survey) Barangay Affairs
LGU Bxpendit, res 11.2.1 AwareneSs of the: (%to 111.3.3 Citizen's Empowerment
1.2.2 Ratio of Human Priority Total) Rate
Expenditures to Total Health Centers/RHUs a)Perception ofNGO
LGU Bxpenditums Hospital Influe_nce onLGU Affairs
1.2.3 Ra00 of Social Day Care • b) Perception of Barangay
Expend/rare tototal LGU Other Welfare Services Influence on LGU Affairs
Income A_k-ult-u_e/Fishery
Related Services
1.2.4 Ratio of Human Priority
Bxpendtture to Total _ 11.2.2 Availment of
Income following Services/
Pa¢/li_ (%toTotal)
1,2.5 Per Capita LGU Social Heath Centers/RHUs
BxpendRum Hospital
1,2,6 Per Capita LGU Human Day Care
Priority 13xpenditure Other Welfare Services
1.2.7 Per Capita Total LGU Agriculture/Fishery
"xpendimm Related Services
1.2,8 Updated Annual II,2,5 Sa_fac_onof the
Developm_t PI_ foUowing Services/
Approvedby San_'tian l:acil/ti_ (% NetSatisfied)
1.2.9 Imptowd l_udgetSys'a_n Health Centers/RHUs
in Place Hospital
DayCam
L$ REVENUE AND Other Welfare Services
SI_YPO_,Tb_STI_ A_rtcultom/Fishery
DIVE_I_ICATION Rektted Services
L5.1 Cost Recovery Measures:
a)Hosp/ml Reve_tue to IL$ USE OF NON-
Hospital Budget TRADITIONAL MODES
b)Revemuefrompublic OF $_RVI C]_S
_tk_ to PubLicBnmr- DSL1VIJRYI,_I_
pr_eBxpenditures FRANCHISING AND
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f) Revenue from II.4 EXTENT OF PARTI-
Slaughter-house to CIPATION OF CIVIL
Public Enterprise SOCIETY INSTITUTIONS
Expenditure IN SERVICE DELIVERY
g) Revenue from Public II.4.1 Number of NGOs, POs,
Utilities to Public and Business Firms
Enterprise Expenditure Engaged by an LGU in
1.3.2 Community-Based Seryice Service Delivery
Support System such as: II.4.2 Number of NGOs, Pos, and
a) Health Insurance Business Firms Engaged in
b) Provident Fund Monitoring and Evaluation
c) Cooperative of LGU Basic Services
1,3.3 Use of Market-Oriented II.5 EXTENT OF PARTI-
Mechanisms like BOT, CIFATION OF CIVIL
Franchising, Service SOCIETY INSTITUTIONS
Contract Arrangements, IN LOCAL SPECIAL
Vouchers, and Bond BODIES
Floatations IL5.1 Proportion Of NGO
a) BOT Member ship to Total
b) Bond Floatation Composition of Local
e) Privatization/ Development Councils
Management Contract (LDCs)
d) Bank Loan II,5,2 Frequency of Meeting of
e) Others Local Development Council
II.5.3 Ratio of NGO Member to
Required Number of
Member in Local School
Board (LSB)
II.5.4 Frequency of Meetings of
LSB
II.5.5 Ratio of NGO Member to
Required Number of
Member in Local Health
Board (LHB)
II.5.6 Frequency of Meetings of
LHBMANASAN, GONZALEZ & GAFFUD : INDICATORS OFGOODGOVERNANCE 209
Appendix 3. Formulae used to compute the different indices
1. Local Revenue Effort
Loc rev eff index_ = rain ( I, total loc rev_/ popn_ .)
2 *natl ave per pax loc rev
where total loc rev_refers to total local source revenue of LGU i;
popn_ refers to population of LGU i;
nail ave per pax loc rev refers to the national average per
capita local source revenue.
2. Cost Recovery Index
Cost reco index_ = min ( I, act ent rev_/act ent expd_ )
2 *natl ave cost reco
where act ent rev_ refers to actual revenue from specified
enterprise/activity in LGU i;
act ent expd_ refers to actual expenditure in specified
enterprise/activity in LGU i;
naflave cost reco refers to national average cost recovery
ratio in specified economic enterprise.
3. Per Capita Social Service Expenditure Index
Soc serv expd index, ---min ( 1, act socserv expd, / loop_____nn i)
2 * natlavesocservexpd
where act soc serv expd_ refers to actual social service
expenditure of LGU i; and,
nail ave soc serv expenditure refers to the national
average per capital social service expenditure.210 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
4. Social Service Expenditure Ratio
Soc serv expd ratio, = rain ( t, act soc serv expd_/tot LGU expd_ )
2 * natl ave soc serv expd ratio
where tot LGU expd i refers to total expenditure of LGU i.
5. General Revision in Schedule of Market Values Index
Gen rev index_ = 1,if general revision of schedule of market
values was approved by Sanggunian in 1996;
= 0, otherwise.
6. Annual Development Plan Index
Arm dev pln index_ -- 1, if Annual Development Plan for
1996 was approved by Sanggunian;
-- 0, otherwise.
7. Net Satisfaction Rate with Specified Services Provided
Net satisfaction rate = (l/N) (G - n,,) * 100
where ns is the number of respondents who are satisfied with
specified social service delivered;
nns is the number of respondents who are n6t satisfied
with specified social service delivered; and
N is the total number of respondents.
8. Macro-accountability Index
COd audit index1 = 1 - (amt disallowi )
tot expdj
if amt disallow_ < tot expd_ and
COA audit index_ = 1MANASAN, GONZALEZ & GAFFUD : INDICATORS OFGOODGOVERNANCE 211
if amt disallow t > tot expd iand
where tot expdi refers to total expenditure of LGU i;
amt disallow irefers to amount of current year
disallowances of LGU i.
9. Index of Citizens' Participation in NGOs
Citi part rate _ NGO = npNaO
N
where npNc_ refers to the number of respondents who are
members of NGOs; and
N refers to total number of respondents.
10. Index of Citizens' Participation in Barangay
Citi part rate _ brgy = nt,b,_
N
where n_,t,_ r refers to the number of respondents who are
participating in barangay affairs.
11. Index of Citizens' Perception of NGO Empowerment
n
iNGO
Index of NGO influence on LGU aflhirs =
N
where niNGO is the number of respondents who perceived
NGOs are able to influence LGU policies and actions.
12. Index of Citizens' Perception of Barangay Empowerment
Index of barangay influence - rtib,_
N
where n,b,_yis the number of respondents who perceived
barangays are able to influence LGU policies and actions.212[ JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
13. Exit Index
Exit index - 1,if LGU is engaged in any one of the various
innovative service delivery schemes like
management contract, BOT, etc.
= 0, otherwise.
14. Service Inputs Adequacy Index
natl stnd
serv inp adeq indexi = min (1, (no trgt clnti)/(act no persnL ))
where nail stnd refers to the national benchmark;
no trgt clnt_ refers to the number of target clientele in
LGU i;
act no persnl i refers to the actual number of relevant
personnel in LGU i.
15. Index of Vertical Linkage with NGA





16. Index of NGO Participation in Local Special Bodies
where act no NGO rep_ refers to actual number of NGO
representative in specified local special body of LGU i;
prescr no irefers to prescribed number of NGO
representative in specified local special body of LGU i.